

Computing Mixed Nash Equilibria

Battle of the Sexes

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B	2, 1	0, 0
F	0, 0	1, 2

- It's hard in general to compute Nash equilibria, but it's easy when you can guess the **support**
- For BoS, let's look for an equilibrium where all actions are part of the support



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- Likewise, player 1 must randomize to make player 2 indifferent.
 - Why is player 1 willing to randomize?
- Let player 1 play B with q , F with $1 - q$.

$$\begin{aligned}u_2(B) &= u_2(F) \\q + 0(1 - q) &= 0q + 2(1 - q) \\q &= \frac{2}{3}\end{aligned}$$

- Thus the mixed strategies $(\frac{2}{3}, \frac{1}{3})$, $(\frac{1}{3}, \frac{2}{3})$ are a Nash equilibrium.



Interpreting Mixed Strategy Equilibria



What does it mean to play a mixed strategy? Different interpretations:

- Randomize to **confuse** your opponent
 - consider the matching pennies example
- Randomize when **uncertain** about the other's action
 - consider battle of the sexes
- Mixed strategies are a concise description of what might happen in **repeated play**: count of pure strategies in the limit
- Mixed strategies describe **population dynamics**: 2 agents chosen from a population, all having deterministic strategies. MS gives the probability of getting each PS.